The Russian-Georgian War of 2008 drastically changed Europe´s and Sweden´s political climate.Russiashowed that it is capable of successfully completing complex campaigns including ground, naval and air assets. However, not much has been said about the theoretical framework and doctrine of the Russian military of today. Even less has been researched about Russian use of air power and applied air theory. Are air power assets still considered primarily as support of ground offensives or has the theoretical framework changed?John A.

This essay aims to analyse if the Russian military operation carried out against Georgia between the 7th and 12th of august 2008 were executed with adherence to the Russian principles for military deception, maskirovka.   A superior purpose is to assess the situation according to the Swedish Armed Forces task of identifying possible needs for new or changed needs for abilities and competence.   The method used is two-alternative hypotheses which are tried by comparing actual events before and during the Russian-Georgian War with the ten methods of maskirovka, compiled from military analytical literature. Such traces of resemblance are further examined, both individually and as a part of a larger indication.   Further the essay describes the Russian art of war, the prerequisites for military surprise, information warfare in Russian doctrine, the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the principles for maskirovka.   The conclusion is that the Russian operation was executed with some adherence to maskirovka, though unspecified of to what degree.   Author of this essay is Cadet Martin Svensson of the Swedish Army, currently a student at the Armed Forces Technical School in Halmstad..

The war between Georgia and Russia awakened the world pretty brutally when a small country like Georgia tried to restore order in South Ossetia. The war between the two countries took place over five days in August 2008. This paper discusses the Russian operational art and its development after the war. The starting point is to test the traditional and classic Russian theory of operational art. The aim is to describe and discuss the Russian operational experience and any developments and trends in the Russian Federation's armed forces. The purpose of describing the theory behind the operational art is to create an independent analysis model. The essay?s analysis is based entirely from qualitative research with the collection of qualitative data in the form of texts and documents with a holistic perspective. Initially, the theory chapter is created from an inductive approach to identify, define and describe the operational concept and principles, creating a theoretical model of explanation. The developed analytical model is based on the Russian theory of operational art and takes off from a deductive approach to the collected empirical data. The results of the performed analysis results are interpreted and the product of this presented in the operational conclusions. Russia had a strategic ability to win the war by means of strategic resources related to tempo, simplicity and shock effect on the Georgian troops. Russia carries out a variety of reforms and the outcome of the war demonstrates the importance of Russia having a strategic capacity to make use of one in the type of conflict that Georgia represents. This success shows that the strategic capabilities are initially a success factor, while the deficiencies in the operational and tactical levels cannot be accepted in the long run, but must be developed.

Abstract Title: Krig och fred - 080808. Freds-, krigsjournalistik och propaganda i mediernas rapportering om Georgienkriget: en komparativ studie av Sveriges, Rysslands och USA:s press. (War and peace ? 080808. Peace Journalism, War Journalism and Propaganda in the Media´s Reporting on the Georgia War: a Comparative Study of the Swedish, Russian and American Press.)  Authors: Daniel Lövgren & Tatiana Makarova Tutor: Anna Roosvall Course: Bachelor Thesis: Media and Communication, PR Purpose: The purpose of this essay is to compare how the press in Sweden, Russia and the USA reported on the war in Georgia 2008.